“话”说孙子兵法(英文版2)
来源：英语联盟
v. energy
1. sun tzu said: the control of a large force
is the same principle as the control of a few men:
it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
2. fighting with a large army under your command
is nowise different from fighting with a small one:
it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
3. to ensure that your whole host may withstand
the brunt of the enemys attack and remain unshaken--
this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
4. that the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science
of weak points and strong.
5. in all fighting, the direct method may be used
for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
in order to secure victory.
6. indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible
as heaven and earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.
7. there are not more than five musical notes,
yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
melodies than can ever be heard.
8. there are not more than five primary colors
(blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination
they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
9. there are not more than five cardinal tastes
(sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations
of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
10. in battle, there are not more than two methods
of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two
in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.
11. the direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn.
it is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end.
who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
12. the onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. the quality of decision is like the well-timed
swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy
its victim.
14. therefore the good fighter will be terrible
in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
15. energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
16. amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;
amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head
or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
17. simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,
simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
postulates strength.
18. hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is
simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under
a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
masking strength with weakness is to be effected
by tactical dispositions.
19. thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy
on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
which the enemy will act. he sacrifices something,
that the enemy may snatch at it.
20. by holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
21. the clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
energy, and does not require too much from individuals.
hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize
combined energy.
22. when he utilizes combined energy, his fighting
men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones.
for it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;
if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down.
23. thus the energy developed by good fighting men
is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain
thousands of feet in height. so much on the subject
of energy.
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vi. weak points and strong
1. sun tzu said: whoever is first in the field and
awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle
will arrive exhausted.
2. therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemys will to be imposed on him.
3. by holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,
he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
4. if the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;
if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
5. appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;
march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
6. an army may march great distances without distress,
if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
7. you can be sure of succeeding in your attacks
if you only attack places which are undefended.you can
ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
positions that cannot be attacked.
8. hence that general is skillful in attack whose
opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful
in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
9. o divine art of subtlety and secrecy! through you
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
and hence we can hold the enemys fate in our hands.
10. you may advance and be absolutely irresistible,
if you make for the enemys weak points; you may retire
and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid
than those of the enemy.
11. if we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced
to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
rampart and a deep ditch. all we need do is attack
some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
12. if we do not wish to fight, we can prevent
the enemy from engaging us even though the lines
of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
all we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable
in his way.
13. by discovering the enemys dispositions and remaining
invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,
while the enemys must be divided.
14. we can form a single united body, while the
enemy must split up into fractions. hence there will
be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
which means that we shall be many to the enemys few.
15. and if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
16. the spot where we intend to fight must not be
made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
against a possible attack at several different points;
and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will
be proportionately few.
17. for should the enemy strengthen his van,
he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear,
he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left,
he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right,
he will weaken his left. if he sends reinforcements everywhere,
he will everywhere be weak.
18. numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
our adversary to make these preparations against us.
19. knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,
we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order
to fight.
20. but if neither time nor place be known,
then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right,
the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van
unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van.
how much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest
are separated by several li!
21. though according to my estimate the soldiers
of yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
them nothing in the matter of victory. i say then
that victory can be achieved.
22. though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
prevent him from fighting. scheme so as to discover
his plans and the likelihood of their success.
23. rouse him, and learn the principle of his
activity or inactivity. force him to reveal himself,
so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
24. carefully compare the opposing army with your own,
so that you may know where strength is superabundant
and where it is deficient.
25. in making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,
and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,
from the machinations of the wisest brains.
26. how victory may be produced for them out of the enemys
own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
27. all men can see the tactics whereby i conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
is evolved.
28. do not repeat the tactics which have gained
you one victory, but let your methods be regulated
by the infinite variety of circumstances.
29. military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
30. so in war, the way is to avoid what is strong
and to strike at what is weak.
31. water shapes its course according to the nature
of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works
out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
32. therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33. he who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called
a heaven-born captain.
34. the five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make
way for each other in turn. there are short days and long;
the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
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vii. maneuvering
1. sun tzu said: in war, the general receives his
commands from the sovereign.
2. having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof
before pitching his camp.
3. after that, comes tactical maneuvering,
than which there is nothing more difficult.
the difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists
in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
4. thus, to take a long and circuitous route,
after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting
after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him,
shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.
5. maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
6. if you set a fully equipped army in march in order
to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
too late. on the other hand, to detach a flying column
for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
and stores.
7. thus, if you order your men to roll up their
buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day
or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage,
the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into
the hands of the enemy.
8. the stronger men will be in front, the jaded
ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth
of your army will reach its destination.
9. if you march fifty li in order to outmaneuver
the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
and only half your force will reach the goal.
10. if you march thirty li with the same object,
two-thirds of your army will arrive.
11. we may take it then that an army without its
baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
without bases of supply it is lost.
12. we cannot enter into alliances until we are
acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
13. we are not fit to lead an army on the march
unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices,
its marshes and swamps.
14. we shall be unable to turn natural advantage
to account unless we make use of local guides.
15. in war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
16. whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
must be decided by circumstances.
17. let your rapidity be that of the wind,
your compactness that of the forest.
18. in raiding and plundering be like fire,
is immovability like a mountain.
19. let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
20. when you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
21. ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
22. he will conquer who has learnt the artifice
of deviation. such is the art of maneuvering.
23. the book of army management says: on the field
of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:
hence the institution of gongs and drums. nor can ordinary
objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution
of banners and flags.
24. gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused
on one particular point.
25. the host thus forming a single united body,
is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
or for the cowardly to retreat alone. this is the art
of handling large masses of men.